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In this paper we develop a model that aims to investigate the economic and demographic impacts
of three e ects of the HIV-AIDS epidemic in developing countries. The direct e ect of the HIV
epidemic is that it hits the inherited characteristics of young adults. The two indirect e ects,
resulting from the ﬁrst, are the reduction in productivity of adults and the transmission of the
disease to their o springs. We allow these di erent e ects to act either separately or together, and
we investigate the marginal e ciency of health expenditures on the survival probability of individ-
uals and demographics. The direct e ect of the HIV virus is that it leads adults to increase their
own health expenditure and to decrease that of their children. On the contrary, the transmission
e ect of the HIV virus leads parents to spend more on their children than on their own. We show
that the reduction in productivity of young adults decreases health expenditures for themselves
and their children. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the productivity e ect dominates by large the two
others. Moreover, when adults decide to have fewer children because of HIV, we show that the
ratio of low to high skilled workers increases. This demographic impact impoverishes the economy
in the short and medium run.
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11 Introduction
The AIDS epidemic is one of the most destructive health crises of modern times, ravaging
families and communities throughout the world. This pandemic has massive demographic
e ects and as proved by signiﬁcant empirical evidence based on the examination of the
e ects of AIDS crisis on the level and growth of income.
The disease is responsible for willing many young adults and there by leaving vast number
of children across Africa or Asia without one or both parents. The loss of a parent because of
AIDS has not only serious consequences on a child’s access to basic necessities such as shelter,
food, clothing, health and education but can also a ect its emotional and psychological state
(see Case, Pakson and Ableidinger (2004), Gertler et al (2003)). More precisely children
whose parents are living with AIDS often experience negative changes in their lives not only
long before orphaned but also after the death of their parents.
Usually parental presence provides emotional support and transmits them values that
are important for the evolution of a child’s human capital (see Gertler et al (2003), Bell
and Gersbach (2008)).These values are lost when a parent is infected by AIDS because he is
no longer able to spend time as he could before his sickness. Furthermore, after the death
of their parents, orphans who live with foster families might be discriminated against by
their foster parents who favor of their biological children (see Case, Pakson and Ableidinger
(2004)). Consequently, it is possible that orphans may miss out on school enrollment, have
their schooling interrupted or perform poorly in school (see Case, Pakson and Ableidinger
(2004)).
In this paper, we develop a model which captures three e ects of an AIDS epidemic.
More precisely, the HIV virus hits the inherited characteristics of young adults and at the
same time this shock implies two indirect e ects. The two indirect e ects are the reduction
in productivity of the adults and the transmission of the disease to their o spring. Allowing
those di erent e ects to act either separately or together and investigating the marginal
e ciency of the health expenditures on the survival probability of an individual and on
demographics in our simulations we ﬁnd a tremendous economic and demographic impact
mainly in the short and in the medium run.
Our model is related to Boucekkine and La argue (2010) which investigate the short,
medium and long-term distributional impact of orphans on the whole economy. It is a three
period OLG model consisting of children, young junior adults and senior adults. A young
junior adult has an exogenous number of infants and he is wholly altruistic concerning their
survival and what their position in the future generation would be. He decides about the
investment on his health, his education and also the health and education expenditures of
his children. The probabilities of survival of a child and a junior adult are dependent on
their amount of health and education spending and their inherited characteristics, their own
human capital. These decisions determine the survival probabilities of their children and
themselves because they depend mainly on health spending.
It is noteworthy to mention that except our paper and Boucekkine and La argue (2010)
that examine the e ects of epidemic in short and in medium run the rest of the literature
focus on the e ects of AIDS in the long run (see Cuddington et al (1994), Kambou et al
(1992) and Arndt and Lewis (2001) Bloom and Mahal (1997) Bonnel (2000), Bell, Devarajan
and Gersbach (2003) and Papageorgiou and Stoytcheva (2005)).
Our analysis consists of two main parts studying both the economic and demographic
impact of an AIDS epidemic though a theoretical framework and simulations. The ﬁrst
part is the economic impact of the disease concerning the decisions of young adults about
their own and their children’s health expenditures. We allow for 3 di erent e ects of the
2epidemiological shock. The ﬁrst one is the decrease in the human capital of junior adults
from the epidemic based on the proposition found in the literature that an epidemic hits
mainly young adults(see for instance Boucekkine and La argue(2010) , Corringan et al
(2004), Boucekkine, Desbordes and Latzer (2009) and Guinness and Alban (2000)). The
other mechanisms are indirect. We suppose that during the epidemic period there is a
decrease of productivity and that parents can transmit their epidemiological shock to their
children. Our results show that the parents decrease their investment because of lower
income and also because they are totally altruistic and they care for their children. On the
other hand, the reduction of productivity decreases their children’s health expenditures and
the transmission of epidemic leads the parents to increase it and to decrease theirs.
The second e ect concerns the demographic impact due to the spread of the disease. In
particular, we observe that there are two main mechanisms like in Boucekkine and La argue
(2010). First, children of wealthy parents have a higher survival probability than those that
have poor parents. This mechanism leads to an increase of the proportion of young adults
with high human capital in medium term. The second mechanism is deﬁned by the increase
in the number children who become orphans. Orphans have a lower probability to obtain
a high level of human capital. Thus, including the above shocks, we notice that the ﬁrst
mechanism ( the survival probability of wealthy people is higher than of the poor) dominates
in the period of epidemic and the second (the increase in the number of orphans) for the
period after the epidemical shock in productivity takes place. On the other hand, the ﬁrst
mechanism dominates all generations in the medium term for the di usion of the shock.
Also, we incorporate the decision of adults for fertility as a consequence of AIDS. There
is a conﬂict concerning its e ect on fertility. In particular,Young (2005), Young(2007) and
Boucekkine, Desbordes and Latzer (2009) ﬁnd that the HIV is lowering fertility in Sub-
Saharan Africa. In contrast, Kalemli-Ozcan (2006), applying a Solow model, shows a neg-
ative relationship between AIDS and schooling and a positive relationship between AIDS
and total fertility rates that lower per capita growth and welfare for the African genera-
tions. Our case is based on the line of Young (2007) and Boucekkine, Desbordes and Latzer
(2009) and we show that the proportion of young adults of low human capital increases and
impoverishes the economy in the short and medium run.
Finally, our model like Boucekkine and La argue (2010) concludes that epidemics, mod-
eled as one period exogenous shocks to adults’ survival probability and later on children’s
survival probability through transmission, have no impact on the long term output distri-
bution.
Furthermore, there are many papers investigating the e ects of AIDS using general
equilibrium models. For instance, Bell, Devarajan and Gersback (2003) develop a two parent
model giving an important role to the number of orphans because of AIDS. They distinguish
di erent categories of orphans and they bring out useful conclusions about the distributional
e ects of epidemics. They argue that AIDS destroys human capital by killing mostly young
people and it also compromises the mechanism through which knowledge and abilities are
transmitted through generations showing as a result a negative e ect of this epidemic on
long run growth. Their di usion is not a ected by health and education expenditures.
The most important contribution of our paper is based on the construction of a di erent
mechanism of transmission:an epidemic can spread from young adults to their infants. It is
true that parents can transmit their values and knowledge to their o spring but they might
also transmit their disease to them. One of the ways of transmitting HIV virus is from
mothers to children through breast feeding. This way of transmission has even worst results
because the children are not only orphans in case that their parents die but also they are
infected and can be refused by other families and society in general.
3Using a OLG framework, Corrigan, Glomm and Mendez (2005) show that the growth
e ects of AIDS are enormous in the long run. They argue that children receive a di erent
level of education depending on whether their parents are healthy or infected. Dividing in
two categories the adults healthy and infected, they investigate how medical expenditures
can enhance the labor productivity of AIDS infected workers. This framework inspired us
to investigate the consequences of reduction of productivity not only concerning the young
adults and their children’s health investments but also its impact on demographics. As
pointed out earlier, none of the previous papers investigate the e ects of an epidemic on the
marginal e ciency of health and education expenditures. Furthermore so far the literature
focused on long term e ects.
As referred to previously, another important aspect of our paper is that it captures the
channel of inequality in the short, medium and long run. The ﬁrst theoretical approach
that relates health expenditures, mortality and inequality across generation was proposed
by Chackraborty and Das (2005). The authors focus their analysis on the fact that poor
parents invest less in their own health and have a high probability of dying. Hence, they save
less and thereby leaving lower bequests to their children if they die. Also they argue that
parents care for the health of their children but in the formulation of the survival probability
of children they do not take into account their health expenditures.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we present the benchmark model,
section 3 develops an extension of the benchmark model including all the di erent epidemi-
ological situations and section 4 provides simulations in the benchmark and extended model
and introduces an exercise on fertility. Section 5 concludes.
42 Benchmark model
We consider a discrete time, perfect foresight dynamic model of a small open economy.
Our benchmark model is a simpliﬁcation of the model of Boucekkine and La argue (2010).
People live for three periods, successively as children, junior adults and senior adults. We
will examine the choices of a junior adult in the given period t. In a second paragraph we
will describe the temporary equilibrium of the model in this period. Also, we assume the
existence of only a single good, health care. This good must be interpreted in a broader
sense, like the investment in human capital. Junior adults make all the decisions concerning
their own and their children’s health expenditures.
A junior adult enters in the period t with an endowment in human capital h. As it
is pointed out earlier, the health care or the investment of human capital is considered
as a single good in the economy. This good is produced by ﬁrms which use the human
capital as the only input under the assumption of constant returns to scale. Human capital
endownment, h can be considered as a storage good. We impose the similar assumption
than Boucekkine and La argue (2010) that the productivity of human capital is equal to 1.
Furthermore, every agent decides an amount of savings (the health care is the storage good)
s and in his investment in health l for the period t under the budget constraint
h = s + l. (1)
Spending in health has an e ect on the lifetime of the junior adult. We deﬁne the
probability of senior adult being alive in period t +1as  (l). Each junior adult has an
exogenous number n of children at the end of period t. Senior adults do not receive any
wage. Also, the agent invests e+1 in the health of his children. The probability for each of
them to be alive in the period t +2will depend on this investment. The children do not
take any decisions. If the agent is alive in period t +1and takes care of his children this
probability will be  (e+1). If he is dead, these children will be orphans and the probability
becomes c (e+1) with 0< c1<c<1. So the budget constraint of the agent in the period t+1
is
s = ne+1. (2)
We suppose that the amount of investment spent by the junior adult for the heath of his
children will be the same if he stays alive or she dies in the beginning of period t +1 .
According to this assumption the intertemporal budget constraint of the junior adult is
h = ne+1 + l. (3)
The utility of the junior adult in period t is
U = n (e+1){ (l)vh+ (1    (l))vch}. (4)
The utility of our model is similar with Boucekkine and La argue (2010) with the main
di erence that we consider that everybody has the same human capital h. In obedience to
this utility, the junior adult is considered wholly altruistic. His utility only depends on the
expected human capital accumulated by his children who will reach the adult age. This
speciﬁcation coincides with the evolutionary biology (see Galor and Moav (2002) and 2005).
Consistent with this the parents maximize the probability of survival and the quality of their
children.
Another noteworthy feature is that vh represents the satisfaction a child brings to his parent
when he reaches the adult age with human capital h. When it dies the satisfaction is 0. In
5order to simplify more the utility function, we impose r1 = vh and r2 = vch.Furthermore,
we set r = r1
r2   1 which is r = 1
c   1.
Consequently, the utility function becomes after removing the multiplicative term,
U =  (e+1){ (l)r +1 }. (5)
where r is the satisfaction premium brought by children when at least one parent survives,
the utility for parents to stay alive. In this case, the survival probability of each child is
higher by the factor 1/c.
Finally, the junior adult must solve in period t the program:
Maxl,e+1 (e+1){ (l)r +1 } (6)
h = ne+1 + l (7)
l,e+1 > 0. (8)
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We suppose that we are always in the intervals where both functions are strictly increasing.
The intuition behind this is based on empirical results like Deaton (2003) who noticed that
health spending, health state and longevity of an individual are increasing and concave
functions of his income.
Also, in our model we consider the survival functions such that
 (0) = A
 1  /(1    ) > 0 (12)
and
 (0) = B
 1  /(1    ) > 0. (13)
This idea comes in contrast to Chakrabrorty and Das (2005) who assume that the survival
probability falls to zero with zero investment and it concides with Boucekkine and La argue
(2010) who consider that  (0) and  (0) can be intepreted as the inherent health situations
which are unrelated with the health investments (see Finlay 2005). Contrary to Boucekkine
and La argue (2010), we will however not set the intrisic physical characteristics of children
(A
 
) equal to zero considering the fact that the main contribution of our theoretical model is
to study the consequence of the transmission of an epidemic shock from parents to children.
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6observing these derivatives, we can note that the marginal e ciency of investment does
not respond in the same way to shocks on B and B
 
.The e ciency of health expenditures
falls down with an epidemic lowering B and increases with an epidemic lowering B
 
. This
e ciency decreases for a composite epidemic which decreases by the same proportion the
values of parameters B and B
 
.The same can be infered when the shocks a ect infant
mortality.
Here, we focus on the case where an epidemic can be deﬁned as a drop in the inherent
health of parents. This is compatible with W-shaped age proﬁle of mortality observed in
the majority of epidemics like AIDS and Spanish ﬂu. The demographic impact of such
epidemic is stronger on junior adults than on children and old ages. In particular, it a ects
the working ages. More precisely, it will a ect the young junior adults in this framework.
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We make the following assumptions.
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Lemma 2.1 Program has a unique solution deﬁned by the two equations
Bh+ A
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h   l
n
= e+1. (24)
Proof See Boucekkine and La argue (2007).
Since the benchmark model is a simpliﬁcation of Boucekkine and La argue (2007) the fol-
lowing lemmas are valid.
Lemma 2.2 Lemma 2. (a) A junior adult endowed with high human capital invests more
in his health than a junior adult endowed with low human capital (b) The investment of a
junior adult in his own health increases with the utility for parents of being alive. (c) If A
 
is zero, the investment of a junior adult in his own health is independent of the number of
children otherwise it increases when the later number goes up.
7Lemma 2.3 A junior adult endowed with high human capital invests more in the health of
his children than a junior adult endowed with low human capital. (b) The investment of a
junior adult in the health of his children decreases with the utility for parents of being alive.
(c) if A
 
=0, the total investment of a junior adult in the health of his children is independent
of the number of his children, otherwise it increases when the latter number goes up.
Lemma 2.4 (a).The investment of a junior adult in his own health increases in case of
epidemic (when the parameter B
 
decreases).
Proof See Boucekkine and La argue (2007).
In the next section, the extension of our benchmark model is presented before analyzing the
demographics associated to the latter.
83 Extension Model
3.1 Model
This section extends the benchmark model. The human capital now can take two values h 
and h+ with 0< h <h+. Further, a child staying alive with alive parents has a probability
p of obtaining a human capital of h+ and a probability 1-p of obtaining a human capital of
h . Similarly, an orphan which succeeds in staying alive has a probability q of achieving
high level of human capital and 1-q of reaching the low level of human capital. We suppose
that
0   q < p   1.
Given the assumptions, the utility function of a young junior adult takes the following form
in period t:
U = n (e+1){ (l)v[p(h
+   h
 )+h
 ] + (1    (l))vc[q(h
+   h
 )+h
 ]}. (25)
We keep the same assumptions than in the benchmark model and we are following the same
simpliﬁcations than Boucekkine and La argue (2010) which are
r1 = v[p(h+   h )+h ],r 2 = vc[q(h+   h )+h ]= >r=
r1
r2
  1. (26)
Under the assumption now r becomes an increasing function of the inequality of earnings
(h+   h )
h  (27)
are expected the next period. Also, in the following comparative statics we will assume that
r and h can change independently. Therefore, in this model we allow for an epidemic shock
to have 3 di erent e ects. The ﬁrst e ect acts like in benchmark model i.e. a decrease in the
survival probability of young junior adults. The other two e ects are indirect. We consider
that the epidemic a ects also the productivity of workers. Corrigan, Glomm and Mendez
(2005) discriminate the healthy and infected individuals, whose productivity decreases dur-
ing the epidemic period. Furthermore, we impose that the shock of epidemic does not only
a ect the young juinor adults but also their children through a transmission mechanism.
Consequently, we relax our assumption of a productivity of human capital being equal to
1 and we consider that the epidemic has an impact on it. Furthermore, every agent sets
saving( the health care is storage good) s and his investment in health l for the period t
under the budget constraint
 h = s + l. (28)
The junior adult’s program is
Maxl,e+1 (e+1){ (l)r +1 } (29)
 h = ne+1 + l (30)
l,e+1 > 0. (31)
Where   deﬁnes the productivity of infected workers between zero and one during the
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We deﬁne a generational trasmission of the shock of epidemics from the parent to child as
Bell and Gerspach(2008) did. We impose that A
 
is inﬂuenced by B
 
. More intuitively , if
the parameter B
 
decreases at the period t , we assume that a fraction of the children of the






Where  t is between 0 and 1. The assumptions are then transformed:
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Now, we can establish the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.1 Program has a unique solution deﬁned by the two equations
B h + A
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Proof Eq. (41) is the constraint of program. We use this constraint to eliminate e+1 from
the objective function. This function is concave in l. Equation 41 is the ﬁrst order conditions
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and because of inequality (38)
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10y(l) has a unique minimum which is negative, for
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Hence Eq.(40) determines a unique value for l, which is positive and smaller than h. We
have to investigate that this solution satisﬁes
Bl+ B
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1
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This is equivalent to
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which results from inequality (36). We also check that
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This condition is satisﬁed because of inequality (37).
Lemma 3.2 • The probability of survival of a junior adult decreases relatively less for
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• The probability of survival of a child decreases relatively less if the parents are endowed
with high human capital than if his parents are endowed with a low human capital.
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11We notice that if in equation (49) we consider A
 
= 0 and  =1 as Boucekkine and La argue
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Then we substitute Eq. (40) in this expression. We deduce from Eq.(9) and (42)
d (e+1)
 (e+1)
= (1    )
e+1
e+1
=  (1    )
dl
 h   l
(53)
We substitute in the right side of this equation the expression of dl given above and get
Eq.(46). Remind that if
 h   l = ne+1 (54)
increases with h, then the factor of dB
 
in Eq. (47) is a decreasing function of h (see Lemma















Boucekkine and La argue (2010) show that when B
 
decreases, the parents will increase
their health expenditures and reduce those of their children. Now, having the indirect e ects,
reduction of productivity and transmission of disease to children, we expect a variation in
our results. This comes from the intuition that the infected parents will be less productive
workers and consequently, will obtain lower income than before. Thus, they will spend less
for their own and moreover for their children’s health expenditures. Also, since we assume
that the parents are wholly altrustic, they will decrease their health investment as the
transmission of shock increases and will increase that of their children. Having this variation
in the decision of parents concerning health expenditures, we can not conclude which e ect
dominates and we need to carry out simulations (see section Quantitative analysis).
3.2 Demographic variables
Before applying simulations to the model, the demographic variables need to be investigated.
The population alive in period t contains N2+ and N2  junior adults with human capital
endownments equal to h+ and h  respectively . It also contains N3+ and N3 senior adults.
Moreover, it includes N1+and N1  children who have parents with respective human capital
12h+ and h  and N101+ ,N101  are number of orphans with respectively bequests. The parents
will be the senior adults according to the equations
N1+ = nN3+and N1  = nN3 . (55)
The populations N101+,N2+,N3+,N1+ ,N101 ,N2 ,N3 ,N1  are determined for the period
t. The number of senior adults endowed with a given amount of human capital which will
be alive in period t +1is equal to the number of junior adults of the same human capital
who are alive in period t multiplied by the survival rate
N
3+
+1 =  (l+)N2+and N
3 
+1 =  (l )N2 . (56)









2    nN
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The numbers of junior adults of the two human capital endownments in period t+1 are
N
2+
+1 =  (e
+
+1)(pN1+ + cqN101+)+ (e
 
+1)(pN1  + cqN101 ), (58)
N2
+1 =  (e
+
+1)(N1+ + cN101+)+ (e
 
+1)(N1  + cN101 )   N
2+
+1. (59)
3.3 Dynamics and long run equilibrium
In this section we investigate the dynamics of equations (55)-(59). Later we develop the
characterization of these demographic dynamics when the economic environment remains
unchanged1.
3.3.1 The dynamics of population
As mentioned previously, there are two kinds of junior adults, N2+ and N2 , alive in period
t >0 with high and low human endowment respectively. Each of them has n children. These
children will either become N2
+2 junior adults with earnings equal to h at period t +2or
they die at the period t +1 . Also, D+2 represents the additional number of junior adults
who would exist if children had not died before reaching the age of junior adult. This means
that   would be equal to one. Our interest is focused on the dynamics of the model for t  
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a12 =  (e
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 )p + [1    (l
 )]cq}
a22 =  (e ){ (l )(1   p) + [1    (l )]c(1   q)}
1We need to mention that we use similar notation with Boucekkine and La argue (2010).
13and with N2+(0) , N2 (0) and D(0) given if t is even and N2+(1) , N2 (1) and D(1) given
if t is odd. Lemma 1, 2 and 3 that are also valid in the extension model impose that the
above parameters satisfy the following constraints
0 <a 12 <a 11 < 1,
0 <a 22 <a 21 < 1,
a12 + a22 <a 11 + a21 < 1
and
a11a22   a12a21 = c(p   q) (e
 ) (e
+)[ (l
+)    (l
 )] > 0.
All the elements of matrix M are positive and the sum of each column of this matrix is iden-
tical to 1. Consequently, they can be equivalent to conditional probabilities. Investigating
the elements of this matrix, we notice that a11-a12 is the di erence between the probabilities
for a child to obtain a high level of human capital if his parents have high capital versus
his parents have low human capital. Also, a21-a22 is the di erence between the probabili-
ties for a child to obtain a low level capital if his parents are highly endowed versus if his
parents are poorly endowed. Furthermore, (a12-a11)+(a22-a21) is the di erence between the
probabilities for a child to die if his parents have high human capital versus if his parents
have low human capital. The fate of children is independent of the social position of their
parents when a12-a11=a22-a21=0.
It is crucial to mention that the elements of matrix M depend on health spending decisions of
junior adults , l+, l , e+, e  for themselves and their children respectively. These spending
functions are determined by a number of exogenous variables in period t: The productivity





  and  , the earnings of the junior adults h+ and h  and n, the number of children.
Equation (60) shows the dynamics of the population of young junior adults N2+, N2  and
of the dead, D for t  2, when the values of these variables are given in periods 0 and 1.
Equations N3+=  (l+) N
2+
 1,N3 =  (l )N
2 
 1 deﬁne the dynamics for the number of senior









+1 from well and low endowed parents
respectively. Also, the dynamics for the number of children are deﬁned by the equations
N1+=nN3+ and N1 =nN3  for t 1.
The equation P=N2++N2 +D can be characterized as the potential population of young
junior adults. More precisely, this equation gives us the potential number of junior adults if
all children have reached the age of junior adults. Consequently, the number of dead junior
adults is D=P-N2++N2 .Thus, we need to focus on the dynamics of living junior adults
which are given by the following equations :
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with N2+(0) and N2 (0) are given if t is even and N2+(1) and N2 (1) given if t is odd. In
our simulations we consider that the epidemic shock in generation 3 occurs and we deﬁne
this generation as period 0, so we assume that t is even.
3.4 Characteristics of demographic dynamics
We suppose that all the parameters and exogenous variables remain constant over time for
t  0. As mentioned previously, we suppose that t is even. Hence, the matrix M will remain
14constant over time. We introduce a new variable that is the discriminant of matrix M, that
we call
  = (a11 + a22)2   4(a11a22   a12a21) = (a11   a22)2 +4 a12a21 > 0. (62)
We introduce a lemma similar to Boucekkine and La ague(2007)
Lemma 3.3 a) The eigenvalues of matrix M,  1 and  2 are real eigenvalues and such that
0< 2< 1 <1. Their values are given by the following equations:
 1 =( a11 + a22 +
 
 )/2 and  2 =( a11 + a22  
 
 )/2 (63)












the right- based eigenvectors of M and by V =(V1 V2) the matrix of these eigenvectors. A
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V1 can be normed such that its components are positive and sum to 1. V2 can be normed
such that its ﬁrst component is negative,its second component is positive and the sum of both
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d)The elements of matrix W satisfy the constraints
w11 >w 12 > 0 and w21 < 0 <w 22 (66)
Proof See Boucekkine and La argue(2007).
Proposition 3.4 Assume, to ﬁx the ideas that N2+(0)+N2 (0)=1. Then: The dynamic
paths followed by the sizes of the cohorts of both kinds of junior adults are linear combinations
of two geometric series with rates equal to the growth rate of potential population n times
the eigenvalues of matrix M
N2+(t+2) = ( 1n)t/2+1v11[w11N2+(0)+w12N2 (0)]+( 2n)t/2+1v12[w21N2+(0)+w22N2 (0)].
N2 (t+2) = ( 1n)t/2+1v21[w11N2+(0)+w12N2 (0)]+( 2n)t/2+1v22[w21N2+(0)+w22N2 (0)].
In the long run the populations of both kinds junior adults will grow at a rate equal to
the growth rate of the potential population of junior adults times the largest eigenvalue of
matrix M (which is smaller than one).The long run size of each group depends on the initial
condition, N2+(0). However, the long run proposition of the two groups of junior adults are
independent of the initial conditions, and are precisely proportional to the two components
of the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue of matrix M.
15Proof See Boucekkine and La argue (2007).
This proposition shows that initial demographic shocks diminish after few periods.
Also, if the vector of the initial values of the population of the two kinds of junior adults is
equal to the eigenvector of M matrix associated to the largest eigenvalue V1, the population
of junior adults will follow the balanced growth path,
 
N2+(t + 2)
N2 (t + 2)
 
=(  1n)t/2+1V1. (67)
According to the previous proposition, the steady state is asymptotically stable. This







Let us investigate more closely the equation 55. The relative variations in the populations
of well endowed and poorly endowed junior adults in the period t=2 are given by the di er-
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The three di erent e ects are present in the  11, v11, 12 and  22. Therefore, it is impossible
to conclude which e ect dominates and simulations should be provided.
164 Quantitative analysis
We deﬁne the epidemic as a drop in survival probabilities of junior adults because of one
period increase death rate of a given generation. We consider the shock on the parameter
B
 
, inherent health characteristics.
HIV invades and ruins the immune system by damaging the CD4 lymphocytes1. These cells
are produced by the thymus and control the functions of the immune system. CD4 lympho-
cytes are also called helper lymphocytes because of the help that they provide to other types
of lymphocytes. A normally immune system prevents the infections and the development of
malignacies.
HIV infection results in a fall of in the number of CD4 lymphocytes with the consequence
that the immune system cannot function normally. As a result, the high risk of infections
and the number of cases with cancer increases(see Gebo et al(2004), Gebo et al (2006)).
This shock has two consequences. The ﬁrst consequence is the reduction in productivity
of junior adults and the second is that the mortality shock is di used from them to their
infants.
We assume that the epidemic hits people independently of their human capital and social
background. Since, an epidemic like AIDS does not discriminate its victims. Our explana-
tion about this abstraction emanates from the fact that HIV is a virus that uses material
from our CD4 cells to make more copies of itself. This virus approaches one particular cell
in our immune system called CD4 cell or T-cell. When it uses that cell’s genetic material, it
destroys the T-cell making and as a result the immune system is unable to protect us from
other infections, thereby involving infected people more vulnerable to disease. When we are
sick our productivity falls (see Glomm, Mendez and Corrigan (2005)).
Furthermore, UNAIDS (2009, November), ’AIDS epidemic update’ refers that¨In 2008,
around 430,000 children under 15 became infected with HIV, mainly through mother-to-
child transmission. About 90 percent of these MTCT infections occurred in Africa where
AIDS is beginning to reverse decades of steady progress in child survival¨. So, an infected
mother by a shock has high probability to infect her o spring either by breasting or during
her pregnacy.
Also, we suppose that nothing can stop this epidemic even if young junior adults have the
possibility to increase their health investment or the one of their children.As mentioned
above, we consider a one generation epidemic. This idea is inspired by Boucekkine and
La argue (2010) because it captures the main mechanism and it helps identifying the e ect
of the epidemic for a given age-proﬁle. At the meantime, considering a shock parting more
than one period leads to more complicated results.
Moreover, inspired by Boucekkine and La argue (2010) we assume that the total population
of junior adults is equal to 1 (see table 1 and table 2 in appendix). Based on this intuition,
we suppose that the total population of senior adults, children and orphans is normalized
equal to 1 in the benchmark and extension model (see table 1).We used data for enrollment
rates of population in education from the Barro and Lee data set. Then, we choose data
sample from countries from sub-Saharian Africa, China and India. More precisely, we chose
countries with the high ranking AIDS deaths from United Nations sources. In this list are
countries that either do not exist in the above data set or have missing values that we replace
them by other countries from sub-Saharan Africa which also have high rate of AIDS deaths.
1Lymphocytes are a type of white blood cell that helps the body ﬁght infection. There are two main
types of lymphocytes; B-lymphocytes and T-lymphocytes.There are two kinds of T-cells: 1) CD4 Cells.These
cells help the immune system to protect the body from infectious invaders such as viruses and bacteria.The
second type is CD8 Cells.These cells destroy the infected cells and produce antiviral substances that ﬁght
o  infectious organisms.
17The table assists us to construct the proportion of poor and well endowed population for our
simulations. We assume that the poor people do not have school education. And we ﬁnd
that in average 73 percent of female population does not attend school in 1985. Moreover,
65 percent of the total population does not attend school the same period. We chose the
year 1985 for the reason that AIDS appeared for the ﬁrst time in April 1984. We impose
the initial proportion 70 percent for the low human capital population and 30 percent for
the well endowed human capital population. Our assumption is also supported by table 2 if
we notice that the average human capital of people that they do not attend school at each
country.The total average of human capital at no school education of all the countries is
67,5 percent.
The model is calibrated under the assumption that one period (or generation) lasts 25 years.
Both models are simulated for 3 generations. We choose 3 generations for two important
reasons. First, we investigate the short and medium terms of an epidemic in these exercises
and second considering one shock , we capture the main consequences of this epidemic shock.
We apply simulations on three di erent exercises.We will ﬁrst simulate the predictions of
the extension model under ﬁve di erent epidemic scenarios, assuming that every adult is
endowed with the same human capital h. We will then run those simulations again, but
allowing for two di erent levels of human capital, h+ and h . Last, we will simulate the
extension model when allowing di erential fertility, i.e. allowing for the number of children
of adults belonging to the two existing classes to di er form one another. We choose the
parameters of the model such that the probabilites of survival of children and junior adults
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 =0.1 L =0.5
 =0.4 e =1
c=0.999 N1+=0.3
v=1 N1 =0.7
p=0.5 N2+=0.3 and N2 =0.7
q=0.4 N3+=0.3 and N3 =0.7
h+=1500 N101+=0.3 and N101 =0.7
h =500
18The inherited health characteristics of junior adults,B
 
, is set to B
 
=0.4.2 and B, which is
the proportion of their health investment that has e ect on their health is imposed equal to
0.1. The value is small for four reasons.
• We suppose that nothing can stop this epidemic even if young junior adults have the
possibility to increase their health investment or of their children consequently the
e ect of B is supposedly small.
• According to the deﬁnition of probability, we need the survival probability of young
junior adults to be lower than one.
• We manage to construct the probability of young junior adults as Corrigan, Gloom
and Mendez (2005) who consider that a healthy person has survival rates around 96
percent and the people a ected by an epidemic have the lowest survival rate is 80-87
percent in their simulations. Also, this explanation leads us to deﬁne the initial value
of their health investment l equal to one and  =0.4.
• We needed the B
 
to cover the condition 0 <B
 
< (1    )1/(1  ).Consequently, im-
posing  =0.4, it is necessary to choose B
 
less than 0.73.
These values concern the well endowed young adult. We suppose here that the values
B and B
 
are the same for the poor endowed young adult. So, the di erence in both
classes concerning the survival probability is the di erent investment expenditures.
More precisely, we know that a young adult poorly endowed with human capital has
lower survival probability than the well endowed adult. The main cause in our simu-
lations are the health expenditures. Consequently, we impose as initial value l =0.5
and their survival probability to be 0.82 .
Furthermore, as it is mentioned in previous paragraphs, we assume that the epidemic hits
the inherited health characteristics. According to Gebo et al (2004) and Gebo et al (2006)
the absolute CD43 count and CD4 percentage4 can predict HIV progression.The same stud-
ies found that when the CD4 percentage is less than 15 percent, CD4 percentage should
be considered along with the absolute CD4 count when determining illness risk and when
to start HIV treatment. Consequently, we set the decrease in B
 
around 15 percent the
period(or generation) that the epidemic takes place.
In all the simulation exercises, the productivity of all workers is assumed to be equal to 1.
When the epidemic takes place the productivity of infected workers will be 0.5 (see Corri-
gan Gloom and Mendez (2005)).Also,this corresponds to AIDS related productivity losses
mentioned in Guinness and Alban (2000), who ﬁnd losses in agricultural output around 60
percent. It is worth to report that in the second model, we determine di erent productivity
losses. The reason is that the job of low skilled low workers is based on their productivity
and the epidemic a ects it more than high skilled. As a result, we determine for the high
skilled workers’ productivity around 0.7.
2In the beginning of our calibration, we imposed many di erent values either on B
 
or B such that t the
survival probability of young adult remained between 0.96 and 0.82 and our results are robust.
3The absolute CD4 count is a measure of how many functional CD4 T-cells are circulating in the blood.
The lower the absolute CD4 count, the weaker the immune system. The absolute CD4 count is measured
by a simple blood test and is reported as the number of CD4 cells per cubic millimeter of blood. HIV-
negative people typically have absolute CD4 counts between 600 and 1200 CD4 cells per cubic millimeter.
HIV-infected people have counts that are less than 500 CD4 cells per cubic millimeter.
4CD4 percentage represents the percentage of total lymphocytes that are CD4 cells. The CD4 percentage
is measured using the same blood test as the absolute CD4 count.
19Furthermore,we set that A=0.004and the inherited characteristicsof children are A
 
=0.4.The
reasons are the following:
• We suppose here that the children’s production of CD4 is the same as the young adults,
regardless the fact that CD4 is expressed in higher levels and on more cells in young
thymocyte populations than in old populations in the thymus(see Kitchen et al (1997).
This assumption is based on the idea that the senior adults are the old population in
our model. Also, our assumption is enhanced by medical literature (see Beisel (1996)
and Hegde et al (1999)) that mention reduction of CD4 cells due to malnutrition.
Usually, countries with high ranked AIDS deaths are faced with problems of malnu-
trition. Again these values are imposed in order to keep the survival rate of children
below one and therefore less than their parents. The ﬁrst is based on the deﬁnition of
probability. The latter is based on the assumption that a child’s survival probability
is lower than the one from a young adult.
• We also satisfy the condition 0 <A
 
< (1    )1/(1  ).
Finally, we choose the initial health expenditure of children to be e=1. This choice
is based on the desire to keep their survival probability below 1. Therefore, we keep the
same initial expenditure for children and young adults under our assumption that parents
are wholly altruistic. Similar, we impose these parameters on the population endowed
low human capital except the for expenditures on children’s health that are lower e =0.5.
Moreover,we impose arbitrary that h+=1500 dollars and h =500 dollars. These values
discriminate the wages of junior adults with high and low human capital. Also, they are
imposed to satisfy the constraints of the model.
A woman with HIV can transmit the virus to her o spring either during pregnancy, labour
or after childbirth via breastfeeding. The United Nations refers "Approximately one fourth
to one third of children born to HIV-positive women are likely to acquire infection from their
mothers. Paediatric HIV infection is expected to have a substantial impact on mortality
during infancy and childhood, particularly among older children (above age one).Children
who acquire the HIV virus from their mothers during childbirth or breast feeding usually
do not survive long enough to enroll in school. Children die young from HIV owing to
mother-to-child transmission and to the weakened ability of infected mothers to care for
their infants and young children".
Cohen (1998) writes on Southern Africa: "Infant mortality rates are already rising sharply
in countries with mature epidemics. Children born to mothers who are HIV positive have
a 30-60 percent chance of becoming positive themselves". WHO, UNAIDS and UNICEF,
Towards Universal Access: Scaling up priority HIV/AIDS interventions in the health sector,
Progress Report 2009 mentions that:"Each year, many children are newly infected with
HIV, mainly through mother-to-child transmission. An overwhelming majority or more
than 90 per cent of HIV infections in infants and children are passed on by mothers during
pregnancy, labour, delivery or breastfeeding. Without any intervention, between 15 per cent
and 45 per cent of infants born to mothers living with HIV will become infected (5 or 10
per cent during pregnancy, 10 or 20 per cent during labour and delivery and 5 or 20 per
cent through breastfeeding). Approximately 50 per cent of infants infected with HIV from
their mothers die before their second birthday." In our analysis, we assume that the chance
of the transmitting HIV from a mother to children is around 45 percent for poorly endowed
mothers and 25 percent for well endowed without treatment4.
4These numbers are inspired from Reports and WHO and HIV Handbooks and infant feeding technical
consultation,Chronic HIV Care with ARV therapy and prevention. Integrated management of adolescent
20At the end, the human capital is chosen in such way as to follow the assumption and
restriction that e and l must be positive.
Concerning the fertility, we take the case of China. In China, the number of children n
is selected equal to one accordingly to the one’s child Policy. This law continues to exist
through the period 2006-10 and we will be reconsidered after this period. We ﬁnd that
the number of children in China is n=1.8 from the United Nations Population department
database.The reason of existence of this number is that the law of one child in China is
voluntary. Government imposes heavy ﬁnes and punishments on couples which do not
respect this law.Also, we need to remark that many parents with more than two children do
not declare all their children. Moreover, in 17 provinces couples are permitted to have second
child if the ﬁrst is girl. In particular, in wealthy provinces such as Guandong and Hainan
rural families are allowed to have two children regardless of the sex of the ﬁrst.Also, minority
groups like Miao and Mongols are generally allowed to have three children if the ﬁrst two
are girls.5.In our simulations, we are based on the United Nations Population database.
Here we suppose the shock to be anticipated: it could be so in the case of a chronic disease
(like malaria) or because the economy has been experiencing an epidemic hitting adults
before t =0 , which is likely to be transmitted to children (like AIDS). Let us base the
reasoning on the assumption that junior adults are struck by an epidemic at period t=0
which is the ﬁrst generation in our quantitative analysis. We consider 5 scenarios:
• Scenario 1: No epidemic shock across generations.
• Scenario 2: Shock in B
 
.
• Scenario 3: Shock in B
 
a ects the productivity of workers.
• Scenario 4: Shock in B
 
transmitted to children.
• Scenario 5: All the shocks together.
4.1 Benchmark Model
In this section, we examine the health investment decisions of young junior adults . Also,
we focus on the structure of the population of young adults, senior adults, children and
orphans in the deﬁned scenarios. Their number in each scenario is always compared to the
ﬁrst scenario.
and adult illness; Integrated management of childhood illness. Interim guidelines for health workers at health
centre of district hospital outpatient clinic. World Health Organisation and Handbook of HIV Medicine.
Oxford University Press, Southern Africa. 5th Edition 2005. Chapter 34 (Infant Feeding), Chapter 41
5New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Times of London, National Geographic, Reuters
Compton’s Encyclopedia are the mainly sources for these acts
21Table 3
Health investment for Junior adults
(Benchmark model)
Generations
Scenarios 1 2 3
Expenditures
Scenario 1 78.9710 78.9710 78.9710
Scenario 2 79.5603 78.9710 78.9710
Scenario 3 70.2279 78.9710 78.9710
Scenario 4 77.1079 78.9710 78.9710
Scenario 5 67.5792 78.9710 78.9710
Table 4
Health investment for children
(Benchmark model)
Generations
Scenarios 1 2 3
Expenditures
Scenario 1 511.6828 511.6828 511.6828
Scenario 2 511.3554 511.6828 511.6828
Scenario 3 238.7623 511.6828 511.6828
Scenario 4 512.7178 511.6828 511.6828
Scenario 5 240.2338 511.6828 511.6828
Table 3 shows that having a shock in B
 
leads to an increase in the investment of
junior adult’s own health expenditures (amount in dollars). This conﬁrms our Lemma 2(b).
Continuously, when this shock inﬂuences the productivity of workers, a junior adult takes
the opposite decision which is the decrease of family’s health investment. The intuition
behind this is that less productive people receive lower wages and they invest less for their
own and their children’s health. This reduction is presented in scenario 3 in tables 3 and
4 the period of that epidemic takes place. A similar result can be noticed when there is a
di usion of the mortality shock from parents to children. More precisely, they decrease their
investment but at the same time they increase the health expenditures of their children. In
the last scenario,we incorporate the di usion of the mortality shock from parents to children,
the reduction in productivity of worker and the shock in inherited characteristics.Here, we
can notice that the parents decrease their own and also they decrease their children’s health
investment. Consequently, we can conclude that the di usion of disease from young adults
to children and the reduction of productivity dominates the direct shock as it concerns their
decisions for their own health expenditures (see scenario 5 in Table 3). On the other hand
the reduction in productivity and the decrease of inherited characteristics, which reduce the
survival rate of young adults, dominate the di usion as a result the drop in health investment
of their children(see table 4 scenario 5).
22Finding 1. (a)A junior adult invests less in his health when the e ect of an epidemic in
his productivity is high.(b) A junior adult invests more in his health when the di usion of
epidemic to his children is low.
Table 5
Health investment for Junior adults
(Benchmark model)
Generations
Scenarios 1 2 3
Productivity
 =0.5 70.2279 78.9710 78.9710
 =0.7 74.0454 78.9710 78.9710
 =0.9 77.7482 78.9710 78.9710
 =1 79.5603 78.9710 78.9710
Table 6
Health investment for Junior adults
(Benchmark model)
Generations
Scenarios 1 2 3
Di usion
  =0 79.5603 78.9710 78.9710
 =0.2 77.9305 78.9710 78.9710
 =0.45 77.1079 78.9710 78.9710
 =1 74.6078 78.9710 78.9710
The previous tables illustrate the above ﬁnding. Table 5 displays the decrease of productivity
because of the epidemic. We let the productivity of infected workers be in the interval 0.5
to 1. The  =1 is the case where the productivity of young junior adults have not a ected
by the epidemic. The numbers are chosen as been explained previously in quantitative
analysis section. Roughly speaking, an infected worker will spend less in his health in any
case when his productivity is below one (see table 5 ). The abstraction behind this result
is that obtaining smaller wage as his productivity falls he will spend less money to his own
and his children’s health, as we see later on. Furthermore, table 6 shows the percentage
of transmission from the mother to her o spring starting with the case of no transmission
to the case of total trasmission of the shock. Investigating the behavior of young adults
in this case, we ﬁnd that the young junior adults decrease their health investment as the
transmission of shock increases (see table 6). This result coincides with our assumption that
the parents are wholly altruistic.
Finding 2. (a)A junior adult invests more in his children’s health when the e ect of an
epidemic on his productivity is small.(b) A junior adult invests more in his children’s health
when the di usion of the shock of epidemic to his children is high.
23Table 7
Health investment for children
(Benchmark model)
Generations
Scenarios 1 2 3
Productivity
 =0.5 238.7623 511.6828 511.6828
 =0.7 347.7525 511.6828 511.6828
 =0.9 456.8066 511.6828 511.6828
 =1 511.3554 511.6828 511.6828
Table 8
Health investment for children
(Benchmark model)
Generations
Scenarios 1 2 3
Di usion
  =0 511.3554 511.6828 511.6828
 =0.2 512.2608 511.6828 511.6828
 =0.45 512.7178 511.6828 511.6828
 =1 514.1068 511.6828 511.6828
When the productivity of young junior adults is not a ected by the epidemic, they decrease
slightly the investment in their children. Starting from the assumption that a fall in their
productivity (as resulting from the shock), we observe that they decrease their children’s
health expenditure more and when their productivity is almost half of what they had before
the shock the expenditures for their children are almost half of what they would have spent
without epidemic. As it is discussed before this ﬁnding is coming from the fact that less
productive people would have a lower wage and would spend less for their children’s health
too. Also, in table 8 the parents will invest more in their children’s health as the percentage
of their health shock transmitted to their children is increased. We observe that when there
is full di usion they will invest more in the health of their children during the period of





Scenarios 1 2 3
Scenario 1 100 100 100
Scenario 2 100 98 99
Scenario 3 93 84 94
Scenario 4 98 95 98
Scenario 5 91 79 92
Table 9 illustrates the structure of the population of senior adults in the di erent scenarios.
Introducing an epidemic that a ects the inherited characteristics of young junior adults, B
 
,
reduces the number of senior adults in period 1(see scenario 2, generation 2). Progressively,
adding the two indirect e ects, productivity and transmission of the shock from parents to
their infants(scenarios 3 and 4 respectively), we observe that their number falls during the
epidemic period and the period 2. The reduction of productivity of young junior adults
decreases their number more than the two other e ects mainly in odd periods. At the
end, scenario 5 contains all the shocks and explains how the structure of their population






Scenarios 1 2 3
Scenario 1 100 100 100
Scenario 2 99 100 99
Scenario 3 84 94 84
Scenario 4 95 98 95
Scenario 5 79 92 79
As mentioned previously, the chosen period for the epidemic shock is the third generation.
Scenario 2 shows that the number of junior adults slightly decreases at period 0 (epidemic
takes places, in our table generation 1). And also there is a drop of their population in period
2 (generation 3). This result coincides with Boucekkine and La argue (2010). Introducing
that the epidemic also a ects their productivity (scenario 3) it is notable that all generations
are a ected after the shock. Decreasing productivity leads to the junior adults receive
lower wages so they invest less not only for their health but also for their children’s health
expenditures than they spend if there is only the shock in B
 
or no shock (see scenario 1
and 2 in tables 3 and 4). Scenario 4 illustrates that the transmission of the disease has also
25massively a ected in the structure of their population. Their number is reduced less than in
scenario 3 but their decrease is still high. This result can be explained by the fact that they
decrease their health expenditures (scenario 4, generation 1 in table 4) and increase those of
their children. Consequently their survival probability drops and their number is reduced.
We notice that in the last three scenarios the e ects a ect more the even than odds periods
after the epidemic introduction. At the end, scenario 5 shows the e ect of all the e ects in





Scenarios 1 2 3
Scenario 1 100 100 100
Scenario 2 100 99 99.9
Scenario 3 100 84 94
Scenario 4 100 95 98
Scenario 5 100 79 92
The number of orphans decreases in generations 2 and 3 in all the scenarios that epidemic
takes place except scenario 2. The transmission shock causes high drop on their number. Of
course this table provides only what happens to their population with the di erent e ects.
The most important is to investigate the ratio orphans to children and then we will be able






Scenarios 1 2 3
Scenario 1 100 100 100
Scenario 2 100 99 100
Scenario 3 93 84 94
Scenario 4 98 95 98
Scenario 5 91 79 92
Table 12 presents similar results with table 5. Again, we observe that the di usion of the
shock is mainly the e ect that reduces the number of children. Also, it is worth to mention
that their number highly drops in odd periods after the epidemic.
264.2 Extension Model
In this section, we apply the di erent scenarios to the extension model having two di erent
human capitals, h+ and h . Given that in terms of population structure the results are
similar with those of the benchmark model, our analysis will focus on terms of inequality.
In the beginning, we examine the structure of the population of senior adults and junior
adults and later we mainly discuss the ratios of well-endowed versus poorly endowed junior





Scenarios 1 2 3
High human capital
Scenario 1 100 100 100
Scenario 2 100 99 100
Scenario 3 98 89 97
Scenario 4 98 94 98
Scenario 5 94 85 94
We consider again the generation 1 as the period 0 in which the epidemic takes place.
Table 13 displays the senior adults with high human capital. An epidemic hitting junior
adults does not a ect the number of senior adults alive in period 0 and period 2 but their
number will be lower as the result of epidemic in period 1(see scenarios 1 and 2). Conversely,
we notice that the number of senior adults changes not only during epidemics but also in
the remaining periods (scenarios 3,4 and 5). Also, scenarios 3 and 5 show the number of
senior adults decreases more in odd periods than in even periods. The same results are also





Scenarios 1 2 3
Low human capital
Scenario 1 100 100 100
Scenario 2 100 99 100
Scenario 3 95 87 98
Scenario 4 98 94 98





Scenarios 1 2 3
High human capital
Scenario 1 100 100 100
Scenario 2 99.8 100 99.7
Scenario 3 89 98 88
Scenario 4 96 98 95
Scenario 5 85 96 83
In scenarios 2 and 4, an epidemic a ecting junior adults has small e ects on their number
at period 0 (generation 1). On the other hand, scenarios 3 and 5 show that there is a high
drop in the population of junior adults comparing to the other three scenarios. In scenarios
3 and 4, the reduction in productivity has mainly e ects in period 0 and even periods .
Table 16 shows similar results for the number of junior adults of low human capital for the
ﬁrst two scenarios. On the other hand, in scenarios 3 and 5, the reduction of productivity
creates a di erent structure of their poorly endowed junior adults. More precisely, we notice
that there is a huge drop in the number of poorly endowed adults in period 0 (see table 20
scenario 3 and 5, generation 1). We can conclude that obtaining lower wages than before,
the poorly endowed will have lower income than without epidemic. Consequently, they will





Scenarios 1 2 3
Low human capital
Scenario 1 100 100 100
Scenario 2 99 100 99
Scenario 3 85 98 88
Scenario 4 95 98 95
Scenario 5 80 95 83
28Table 17
Junior adults’s Ratio of Human Capital
(Extension Model)
Generations
Scenarios 1 2 3
High human capital/Low human capital
Scenario 1 0.6070 0.6268 0.6333
Scenario 2 0.6070 0.6268 0.6332
Scenario 3 0.6249 0.6262 0.6356
Scenario 4 0.6203 0.6278 0.6333
Scenario 5 0.6396 0.6274 0.6356
Table 17 displays the ratio of well and poorly endowed junior adults. During the epidemic
period (generation 1) there is an increase of the ratio. Consequently, this means that the
well educated people are more numerous than the less educated when the epidemic takes
place. In period 2, the number of junior adults who were orphans will increase and the
number of those who were brought up by their parents will decrease (tables 13, 14 and
18 respectively). In scenario 2, more young adults will get less educated two periods after
the epidemic and output per worker goes down: the economy is clearly impoverished (with
respect to the reference balanced growth path) at this time. Before starting to analyze
the remaining scenarios, we need to mention that the proportion of young adults with low
human capital changes under two opposite e ects. First, the model generates a mechanism
that leads to an increase in the proportion of young adults with high level of human capital.
This mechanism is due to the fact that the proportion of children surviving falls by a lower
percentage if the parents are wealthy than if they are poor. Also, children of wealthy families
have a higher probability of reaching a high level of human capital than the children of poor
families. Moreover, the model generates another mechanism opposite to the previous one.
In particular, the number of junior adults who were orphans will increase. Orphans have
a lower probability to be well-endowed. Thus, the proportion of young adults with a high
human capital diminishes. After explaining these two mechanisms, we are able to present





Scenarios 1 2 3
Ratio Orphans/children
Scenario 1 0.0585 0.0614 0.0626
Scenario 2 0.0585 0.0615 0.0626
Scenario 3 0.0614 0.0625 0.0626
Scenario 4 0.0596 0.0622 0.0626
Scenario 5 0.0626 0.0633 0.0626
Henceforth, in scenarios 3, 4 and 5, the proportion of well educated people will be higher
than that of less educated in the period t=0 (generation 1). We expected this kind of result
because in scenario 3, the wage of low human capital drops more than that of high human
capital. Consequently they have lower income and invest less in health expenditures.
Also, in scenario 4, the proportion of young junior adults of high human capital increases
at period 0. This conclusion coincides with the results of feeding programs which show that
women with low education, poor access to water and health services and strong cultural
pressures to breast-feed are more likely to transmit the virus HIV to their children than
well educated mothers (Coutsoudis et al (2001)).This point of view is also enhanced by
reports of Unicef which mention that the education is the best defence against the disease.
The more educated and skilled is the population, the more likely people are to protect
themselves from infection; and those in school spend less time in risky situations. From the
education the girls will be able to obtain critical analysis change their stereotypes and learn
more about HIV/AIDS and its prevention. Also, the founder and President of One Bright
World, Fay M. Vassilakis expresses the opinion that a good education will enhance a good
prevention from diseases. More precisely she refers that : "One Bright World6 organization
believes that Education is the key to a meaningful life as it unlocks the opportunities the
world holds. Access to education is as fundamental to the human being as is health and
nutrition. Education feeds the mind, the imagination and the human spirit. The children
of the world deserve access to basic education without economic, gender or any other form
of discrimination. Parents’ educational needs are equally important and the programs of
One Bright World include them in its focus upon basic education and health awareness.
By providing parents and children with basic education and health awareness, we o er the
language, math and life skills that will form the foundation of a more fruitful future for them
and for generations to come".
Furthermore, our results assuming that the shock of epidemic is anticipated, are enhanced by
empirical evidence (De Walque (2007), Stoneburner and Low-Beer (2004)) that points to the
conclusion that less educated young adults will experience a disproportionately large number
of new infections. For instance, De Walque (2007) analysing data from Uganda demonstrates
the importance of schooling in an individual’s response to a prevention campaign. He also
demonstrates the evolving nature of the relationship between HIV and education. In 1990
he found no relationship between HIV prevalence and education. On the other hand, in
6http://onebrightworld.org
302000 having completed primary education was associated with a 5.1% reduction risk of
HIV infection and secondary education was associated with an 8.8% reduction in the risk.
Interestingly, the relationship between HIV and education was found for women and not
men. These ﬁnding supports the thesis that more educated individuals are better able to
mount a response to the HIV epidemic. This structure changes in the following periods.
In scenario 4, the proportion of unskilled junior adults will also increase (compared to the
balanced growth path) in period t=1.We conclude that the second mechanism, the increase
of number of orphans (scenario 3, generation 3 table 18) dominates the ﬁrst mechanism.
Also, we can conclude that many of the survival orphans can be infected by HIV and die
when they become junior adults. We know that a virus like HIV develops AIDS in ten years
or fourteen if the patients follow therapies. The rate of progression can be much faster in
those with weakened immunity from other causes like drugs. As consequence, the output
per worker is lower that period (see table 19). We observe that the two e ects are o set at
period t=2. In table 18, the ratio orphans children increases in epidemic period and also
in t=1 and in t=2 for the scenario 4.But we notice that the ﬁrst mechanism dominates the
second so the proportion of young junior adults of low human capital drops.As a result, we
expect that the output per capita to increase but the total output to drop (table 19). In our
last scenario where we incorporate all the e ects, we notice the medium term distributional
e ects of epidemics. The ﬁrst mechanism dominates all the periods, more young adults will
get more education during these periods and the output per worker will increase regardless





Scenarios 1 2 3
Low human capital
Scenario 1 100 100 100
Scenario 2 99 100 99
Scenario 3 88 96 88
Scenario 4 95 98 95
Scenario 5 83 98 83
We know that, in the long run, the shares of junior adults of well endowed and low endowed
human capital, that is the income distribution will go back to their balanced growth values.
Consequently, in contrast to other contributions in the AIDS-related literature (like Bell
et al., (2003)), the model provides more corrective dynamics which will bring some key
variables to the corresponding balanced growth values. But we cannot even conclude on the
long run change in the total population of junior adults without more assumptions.
31Table 20
Health investment for Junior adults
(Extension Model)
Generations
Scenarios 1 2 3
High human capital
Scenario 1 103.2713 103.2713 103.2713
Scenario 2 103.8595 103.2713 103.2713
Scenario 3 94.7509 103.2713 103.2713
Scenario 4 102.0777 103.2713 103.2713
Scenario 5 92.8650 103.2713 103.2713
Table 21
Health investment for Junior adults
(Extension Model)
Generations
Scenarios 1 2 3
Low human capital
Scenario 1 73.2148 73.2148 73.2148
Scenario 2 73.8019 73.2148 73.2148
Scenario 3 68.2819 73.2148 73.2148
Scenario 4 70.8500 73.2148 73.2148
Scenario 5 65.1991 73.2148 73.2148
32Table 22
Health investment for children
(Extension Model)
Generations
Scenarios 1 2 3
Low human capital
Scenario 1 237.1029 237.1029 237.1029
Scenario 2 236.7767 237.1029 237.1029
Scenario 3 100.9545 237.1029 237.1029
Scenario 4 238.4167 237.1029 237.1029
Scenario 5 102.6672 237.1029 237.1029
Having a shock B
 
which is anticipated leads the parents to increase their investment (lemma
2.1) but we notice that in scenarios 3, 4 and 5 there is a decrease. The two e ects a ect
their decision by decreasing their investment. Tables 20 and 21 show that the reducing
productivity leads to parents to decrease more their health investment. On the other hand
scenarios 3, 4 and 5 in both tables present that the di usion of shock across generations af-
fects more the investment of adults with high human capital. On the contrary, the reduction
of productivity a ects more the investment of poorly endowed capital young adults.
Table 23
Health investment for children
(Extension Model)
Generations
Scenarios 1 2 3
High human capital
Scenario 1 775.9604 775.9604 775.9604
Scenario 2 775.6336 775.9604 775.9604
Scenario 3 530.6939 775.9604 775.9604
Scenario 4 776.6235 775.9604 775.9604
Scenario 5 531.7417 775.9604 775.9604
Tables 22 and 23 illustrate three important results. First, an epidemic shock leads the
parents to decrease their children’s health expenditures in both classes ( lemma1). Second, if
the shock inﬂuences the productivity of the parents, they decide to decrease their children’s
health expenditures but having higher reduction for those of low human capital. Third,
parents under the assumption that there are wholly altruistic decrease their investment and
increase those of their children in both categories at the same proportion. Observing at
scenario 5 we ﬁnd that the di usion shock leads to a small o set of the negative e ect of
productivity in the investment.
334.3 Does di erential fertility matters?
In this model, we considered the fertility exogenous. This is done in order to obtain an
analytical representation of economic and demographic dynamics at any period. On theo-
retical ground a decline in life expectancy can increase or decrease the fertility depending
on parental preferences and on the deﬁned kind of mortality (see Hazan and Zoabi (2006)).
Actually, a high child mortality may increase the willingness of obtain children (increase of
insurance e ect). On the contrary, a Barro-Becker model(1989) where mothers can freely
supply labor would draw under a drop in labor supply, female participation in labor market
will rise, leading to a decrease in fertility.There is a debate in empirical literature concern-
ing the e ect of epidemics on fertility. Young (2005) and Boucekkine, Desbordes and Latzer
(2009) argue that the HIV is lowering the fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa.On the other hand,
Kalemli- Ozkan (2006) using a context of the Solow model, ﬁnds a positive relationship be-
tween AIDS and total fertility rates which lowers per capita economic growth of current and
future generations in Africa. In this paper, we adopt the viewpoint of Young (2005) and
Boucekkine, Desbordes and Latzer (2009) that AIDS decreases the fertility in Sub-Saharan
Africa. We analyse again our model but considering that the young adults well endowed
have di erent number of children from the poorly endowed human capital. More precisely,
we suppose that a junior adult living either having high human capital or low human capital
in period 0 has at the end of this period, a number of children reduced by the amount dn
<0. Now, the junior adult’s program is
Maxl,e+1 (e+1){ (l)r +1 } (73)
 h = ne+1 + l. (74)
l,e+1 > 0. (75)
Program has a unique solution deﬁned by the two equations
B h + A
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 h   l
n
= e+1. (77)
Again, it is di cult to conclude the real e ects of the shocks so we need to provide simula-
tions. As it concerns the demographics, the number of junior adults in period 2 will change.
It will tend to decrease because of the lower number of children born at the end of period 0,
but we do not know what will happen in the decisions of parents for the investment of the
health of each of their children. We tried to compute the total e ect by di erentiating the
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Again, we cannot infer anything for the structure of young junior adults without providing
simulations. In our simulations, we use the same values as in previous exercises except for
the number of children. Now, we consider the case of South Africa, a country that has
large number of deaths because of AIDS. We impose di erent number of children in both
classes and we assume as in scenario 5 that in period 1 junior adults decrease the number
of infants. In scenario 6, we include all the scenarios together to ﬁnd which shock a ects
the decisions of parents concerning the health investments and the demographics. We set
n=4.56 the number of children of young adults of low human and n=3.04 for young adults
34well endowed. Also, these numbers n=3.1 and n=1.85 are chosen for young adults of low and
high human capital respectively. These numbers are taken from United Nations Department
of Population data set. More precisely, we choose the fertility rate of 1980 when the disease
appeared for the ﬁrst time and the last numbers are predictions of fertility rates in 2020.
Table 24
Health investment for children
(Extension Model)
Generations
Scenarios 1 2 3
High human capital
Scenario 1 451.9113 451.9113 451.9113
Scenario 2 451.7173 451.9113 451.9113
Scenario 3 306.3236 451.9113 451.9113
Scenario 4 452.5950 451.9113 451.9113
Scenario 5 451.7173 754.4578 451.9113
Scenario 6 307.2375 754.4578 451.9113
As it can be observed, the ﬁrst four scenarios show similar results with those of extension
model. In scenario 5,young adults decrease their health expenditures and increase those of
their children in period 1 (see generation 2 in tables 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27). It is noticed
that the child mortality
Table 25
Health investment for children
(Extension Model)
Generations
Scenarios 1 2 3
Low human capital
Scenario 1 82.4387 82.4387 82.4387
Scenario 2 82.3093 82.4387 82.4387
Scenario 3 28.3807 82.4387 82.4387
Scenario 4 83.5393 82.4387 82.4387
Scenario 5 82.3093 129.3598 82.4387
Scenario 6 29.6347 129.3598 82.4387
and the decision of parents to decrease the number of their infants increase the insurance
e ect. In particular, the willingness of parents leads to an increase of the health expenditures
of their o springs.
35Table 26
Health investment for Junior adults
(Extension Model)
Generations
Scenarios 1 2 3
Low human capital
Scenario 1 124.0795 124.0795 124.0795
Scenario 2 124.6697 124.0795 124.0795
Scenario 3 120.5840 124.0795 124.0795
Scenario 4 119.0609 124.0795 124.0795
Scenario 5 124.6697 98.9847 124.0795
Scenario 6 114.8656 98.9847 124.0795
In table 28, we present the e ects of the di erent e ects cause by the epidemic in total
output. For the ﬁrst four scenarios, we ﬁnd that we have similar results as our simulations
in the previous sections. More precisely, we argue that in even periods the drop in total
output is high because of epidemic in scenario 2, 3 and 4. Also, in scenario 5, where we
include the decision of parents to decrease the number of their o spring because an epidemic
like AIDS a ects their inherited characteristics, it has massively results on generations 4 and
5. We notice two opposite results.
Table 27
Health investment for Junior adults
(Extension Model)
Generations
Scenarios 1 2 3
High human capital
Scenario 1 126.1897 126.1897 126.1897
Scenario 2 126.7793 126.1897 126.1897
Scenario 3 118.7763 126.1897 126.1897
Scenario 4 124.1113 126.1897 126.1897
Scenario 5 126.7793 104.2531 126.1897
Scenario 6 115.9981 104.2531 126.1897
In generation 2, there is an increase of total income but a massively drop of it follows in
generation 3. Trying to explain these two results, we ﬁnd that by increasing the health
expenditures of their children (tables 25 and 26 scenario 5 generation 3), the junior adults
increase the survival probability of their children. Moreover, we note that the e ects of
epidemic in odd periods are small for the population of junior adults so their mortality is
36low in this period. These two outcomes lead to a rise of the total output of economy in
period 1. On the other hand, there is a huge drop of it in generation 3. This outcome is





Scenarios 1 2 3
Scenario 1 100 100 100
Scenario 2 99 100 99
Scenario 3 93 97 91
Scenario 4 93 97 92
Scenario 5 99 106 58
Scenario 6 86 99 51
The ﬁrst reason is the e ect of the epidemic. As we noticed usually an epidemic has a great
impact of the population of junior adults. Also, this e ect becomes even higher when junior
adults decrease their expenditures for health and increase those of their infants. The second
reason is the decision of the parents to have less children decrease the number of future
junior adults as a consequence of the decrease in total output of the economy, as it would be
without epidemic. The third reason is that looking in tables 29 and 30, we can argue that the
proportion of junior adults of low human capital increase and as result the country has less
educated people and the output per worker goes down the economy is clearly impoverished
(with respect to balanced growth path) at this time (see generation 5 scenarios 5 and 6 on
both tables).
Table 29
Junior adults’s Ratio of Human Capital
(Extension Model)
Generations
Scenarios 1 2 3
Scenario 1 0.5788 0.5998 0.6001
Scenario 2 0.5788 0.5998 0.6000
Scenario 3 0.5803 0.5985 0.6003
Scenario 4 0.5877 0.6045 0.6013
Scenario 5 0.5788 0.6000 0.5938
Scenario 6 0.5890 0.6042 0.5951
37Table 29 displays the structure of junior adults in the di erent scenarios. More precisely,in
the ﬁrst scenarios show the same results like the case of China. It means that AIDS as
epidemic does not discriminate across the countries and it has similar e ects on human
beings. Our discussion focus on scenarios 5 and 6. We observe that the proportion of young






Scenarios 1 2 3
Scenario 1 0.0360 0.0360 0.0370
Scenario 2 0.0360 0.0361 0.0370
Scenario 3 0.0369 0.0361 0.0370
Scenario 4 0.0368 0.0365 0.0371
Scenario 5 0.0360 0.0377 0.0372
Scenario 6 0.0378 0.0382 0.0372
This outcome is due to two main reasons. In generation 2, the survival probability
of children of high human capital is higher than the survival probability of children of
low human capital. In contrast to this, in generation 5, the proportion of junior of poorly
endowed increases. The proportion of orphans increases and also, the decision of less children
in both classes dominates the ﬁrst mechanism.
Finding 3. If the probability for an orphan to reach a high level of human capital, q, is low
enough, and a child who has living parents and who stays alive has a low probability p of
obtaining low human capital we have the following results
• The population of junior adults holding a high level of human capital decreases, and
the population of junior adults with a low level of human capital increases. Thus,
the proportion of junior adults with a low endowment of human capital in the total
population increases. Consequently, domestic output per worker decreases for the next
generations after the epidemic when we include the three e ects.
• The proportion of junior adults with a low endowment of human capital in the total
population increases. Consequently, domestic output per worker decreases for the next
two generations after the epidemic when we include the three e ects and changing the
number of the children.
To prove this ﬁnding, we apply the case of South Africa. We present three scenarios.
Scenario 1 presents the ratio of junior adults without the epidemic. Scenario 2 illustrates
the proportion of junior adults a ected by the three di erent e ects. Scenario 3 displays the
proportion of junior adults a ected by the three di erent e ects and the decision of them to
decrease the number of their infants in period 1 after the epidemic. We keep all the values
as we had imposed earlier and we change p and q. We suppose that p=0.2 and q=0.1.
38Table 31
Ratio Wealthy vs Poor Human capital
(Extension Model)
Generations
Scenarios 1 2 3
Scenario 1 0.2298 0.2148 0.2175
Scenario 2 0.2339 0.2146 0.2175
Scenario 3 0.2339 0.2147 0.2164
When an epidemic takes place, well-endowed junior adults will spend more on the health of
their children. In period 2(generation 3), the number of junior adults who were orphans will
increase and the number of those who were brought up by their parents will decrease. If the
probability for an orphan to reach a high level of human capital, q, is low enough, the number
of junior adults with a high level of human capital, alive in period 2, will become lower. This
ﬁnding is a crucial example of the medium term distributional e ects of young junior adult
epidemics. We observe that the number of orphans dominates the child mortality in both
generations. Also, we argue that indirect e ect of the reduction in productivity dominates
the indirect e ect of transmission for the period 1(generation 2) and also decisions of young
adults concerning the number of their children have massive e ects not only in their future
demographic structure but also in the economy as a whole. More young adults will get
less educated two periods after the epidemic and output per worker decreases: the economy
is clearly impoverished (with respect to the reference balanced growth path) at this time
horizon.
5 Main Results
In this subsection, we summarize the main results of our paper. In particular, we had three
main ﬁndings. The ﬁrst two ﬁndings concern the decisions of parents for their own and their
children’s health expenditures. The ﬁrst ﬁnding mentions that a junior adult invests less in
his health when the e ect of epidemic in his productivity is high and he invests more as the
di usion of epidemic to his children is low (see table 5 and table 6). The intuition behind
these results is that obtaining smaller wage as his productivity falls he will spend less money
to his health and also since agents are wholly altrustic, they decrease their health investment
as the transmission of shock to children increases.
The second ﬁnding refers that a junior adult invests more in his children’s health when
the e ect of an epidemic in his productivity is small and invests more in his children health
as the di usion of the shock of epidemic to his children is high (see table 7 and table 8).
The third ﬁnding concerns the e ects of an epidemic in the total economy and population
in terms of inequality. It mentions that if the probability for an orphan to reach a high level
of human capital is low enough, and a child who has living parents and who stays alive has
a probability of obtaining low human capital is low then the following results exist:
• The population of junior adults holding a high level of human capital decreases, and
the population of junior adults with a low level of human capital increases. Thus,
the proportion of junior adults with a low endowment of human capital in the total
population increases. Consequently, domestic output per worker decreases for the next
generations after the epidemic when we include the three e ects.
39• The proportion of junior adults with a low endowment of human capital in the total
population increases. Consequently, domestic output per worker decreases for the next
two generations after the epidemic when we include the three e ects and the decrease
in the number of children.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a analytical dynamic theory of income distribution under AIDS.
We develop a framework under three di erent e ects of an AIDS epidemic. In particular,
an epidemic hits the inherited characteristics of young adults. In the meantime, this e ect
implies two indirect e ects , reduction in productivity of young adults and transmission of
disease from them to their o springs. We examine the economic and demographic e ects as
a result of these e ects. Within this framework, we have several properties. First, transitory
epidemiological shocks have permanent shocks on the size of population and total output.
Nevertheless, income distribution is not altered in the long run. Second, we show that this
distribution is changed in the short and medium run due to the identiﬁed mechanisms. More
precisely, the survival probability of children with less educated people is too low as well as
the ability of orphans to access high levels of education. We notice that in the short run,
the proportion of young adults with high human capital increases and as a result the output
per worker increases. When, we investigate the decision of parents to decrease their fertility
due to epidemic then there is poverty in the medium run. As further research, we propose
to introduce uncertainty in the epidemic shock and investigating another epidemic in this
case. Also, an edogenization of fertility by applying some adjustments to this model could
lead to interesting results in terms of inequalities.
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437 Appendix
Table 2
Countries Female Total population Population Ranked AIDS deaths
with AIDS (1985) No schooling (1985)No schooling (1960-2000)No schooling
Benin 91,3 85,4 83,3 42
Botswana 46,2 50,0 54,9 2
Burundi 85,5 75,4 74,5 18
Cameroon 68,8 58,0 62,5 16
Central Africa 68,8 78,8 81,7 9
Congo 72,2 58,8 58,8 23
Gambia 94,1 90,0 85,8 52
Kenya 68,6 55,6 59,2 17
Liberia 87,8 76,7 78,9 19
Malawi 71,5 55,0 59,1 8
Mali 95,2 90,8 92,3 43
Mozambique 91,0 78,2 78,3 10
Nigeria 96,5 90,6 91 21
Rwanda 81,3 71,9 72,2 22
South Africa 26,5 24,4 32,5 5
Sudan 88,8 76,7 89,9 41
Swaziland 38,0 42,0 50,2 1
Togo 84,3 71,9 75,5 28
Uganda 76,2 63,1 61,3 29
Zambia 75,4 60,0 75,4 8 7
Zimbaboue 37,5 31,0 33,3 5 4
China 54,7 40,0 36,85 168
India 85,2 66,9 65,3 167
Total average 73,3 64,8 67,5
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